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The Lesson of Kyoto


RIO DE JANEIRO - Is there a lesson to be learned from Kyoto? Two Brazilian experts, Jose Goldemberg and Luiz Gylvan Meira Filho, say the answer is a resounding ''yes.'' And it involves nothing more and nothing less than a basic concept about what gave rise to the entire Kyoto Protocol itself: the calculation of the percentages involved in emissions reduction targets.

''There is an important lesson to be learned: perhaps the emissions limits agreed in the Kyoto Protocol were adopted based on the wrong variable; in other words, the emissions reduction percentages were based on 1990 levels, and not on what would have been desirable, that is, the cost of achieving the reductions,'' they argue.

In an essay titled ''Reflections on the Supplementarity Associated with Flexible Mechanisms,'' the authors study the scope of the concept of ''supplementarity'' and its relationship with several proposals arising from the talks, including the controversial ''sinks'' (any process, activity or mechanism that removes greenhouse gases from the atmosphere).

One of their main recommendations is that future negotiations involving the Kyoto Protocol should take into account the economic costs of mitigation as the central variable. ''That would therefore remove problems such as those arising from supplementarity,'' they maintain.

''There appears to be consensus that the idea behind supplementarity is that Annex I and B Countries should take domestic measures to limit or reduce their emissions before they are given the chance to achieve their targets through flexible mechanisms,'' say the authors.

''Some countries have argued that the supplementarity provisions should be converted into numeric percentages. Others have said these percentages should not be set artificially, but rather should be left to the laws of the market. The question is, however, are limits on supplementarity necessary?''

According to the two specialists, one of the key reasons the Annex I Countries seem to prefer the adoption of numerical limits for implementing flexible mechanisms is the concern that the economic burden in complying with Kyoto Protocol commitments would be unfairly distributed without them.

''If the economic burden for each country as a result of emissions abatement had been a variable at the negotiating table, supplementarity would never have arisen. The same would have occurred with the 'hot-air' talks, in which some of the Annex I countries adopted such high emissions targets that they will have a negative burden in achieving them,'' they maintain.

The complete text by Jose Goldemberg and Luiz Gylvan Meira Filho can be found at: www.tierramerica.net


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